Watching from the sidelines: Why NZ can’t afford to ignore ASEAN’s security measures

Written by Newsroom

The Special Defence Dialogue (SDD) convened for its second day of debate, marking the start of a pivotal phase in constructing robust strategies to address the pressing threat of terrorism. 

Ministers from the ASEAN committee and its partners collaborated and proposed two innovative frameworks designed to reshape regional counterterrorism efforts. 

These frameworks, distinct in their approach and philosophy, are unified by a shared sense of urgency. The first vision, initiated by the Ministers of China, Thailand, and Singapore, seeks to build inter-regional trust and leverage financial intelligence to tackle terrorism by cutting off funds aiding terrorism. 

On the other hand, the second vision, led by the Ministers of the UK, Japan and France, focused on the precision of terminology, cyberterrorism threats, and anti-radicalisation. Together, they aim to reshape the region's response to terrorism, but with vastly different, albeit non-conflicting agendas. 

Diving into the two frameworks 

The first framework revolves around the establishment of an Inter-Regional Counter-Terrorist Charter (IRCC). According to the various Ministers, the IRCC took inspiration from the Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing Information and Cases (COSMIC), serving as a platform for intelligence and data sharing which allows countries to detect plots of terrorism before they materialise and improve border screenings with the collaborative strength of all countries’ intelligence. 

Furthermore, the IRCC also seeks to leverage resources and technical expertise from SDD member states, with minimum contributions proportional to GDP being necessary. This would allow states to strengthen loopholes in their security infrastructure by fair exchange of relevant resources, including but not limited to troops, intelligence, money, etc. 

For example, NZ could offer data governance expertise to ASEAN partners in exchange for ground-up security to strengthen border control and on-ground security, ultimately allowing both parties to benefit from the trade agreement. 

The second framework seeks to equate the definition of terrorism as intentional acts that cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians, frighten populations, or destabilise political or economic structures. 

Furthermore, it takes a preventive approach towards terrorism, attempting to prevent the radicalisation of individuals through recommending countries to enact measures such as censorship against “dangerous” and radicalising content, where the criteria for censorship will be decided by the respective country’s governments. 

Lastly, this framework also implements direct measures to enhance cross-border cooperation, through recommending the formation of security pacts between individual countries. While not as detailed as the IRCC, this solution allows a flexible alternative that encourages bilateral cooperation to achieve common anti-terrorist goals.

While not in direct opposition, these distinct frameworks reflect differing views among ASEAN members and partners on terrorism, sovereignty, and security cooperation. 

How exactly do these frameworks affect NZ? 

To the untrained eye, it would seem as though NZ would have no stake in security issues impacting ASEAN. However, to say that without a deep analysis of the situation would be myopic, as it fails to recognise the severity that these frameworks have in store for NZ. To start off, Wellington approaches security through multilateral diplomacy, laws, and human-centric intervention. It also advocates for fairness and open governance in all of its governmental policies. 

Additionally, NZ maintains strong ties with ASEAN through strategic economic partnerships and essential trade of resources, services, and goods. In 2023, New Zealand's two-way trade with ASEAN was approximately NZ$27 billion, accounting for almost a tenth of NZ’s total trade volume. Terrorist activities, such as maritime piracy or attacks on critical resource extraction infrastructure, can disrupt trade routes and supply chains, impacting NZ’s imports and exports. For example, a terrorist attack on a major port or mining facility could delay or even cancel shipments of goods, driving up prices for Kiwis. As such, it is essential for NZ to closely observe any developments in the ASEAN security scene. 

Given these vulnerabilities, the proposed IRCC offers a structured mechanism for New Zealand to contribute to and benefit from regional security efforts. The intelligence sharing mechanism aligns with pre-existing networks NZ already participates in, such as the Anglophone-focused Five Eyes intelligence alliance. 

Additionally, with NZ’s strong economy but modest military resources, it can greatly contribute to the IRCC with financial resources and benefit from aid in a situation where a shortage of manpower occurs. 

On to the second proposal, a clearer definition of terrorism reinforces NZ’s counter-terrorist strategy, which focuses on approaching terrorist situations with clarity and coordination.

Additionally, a focus on bilateral security pacts allows NZ to form close security ties with trusted partners, allowing for a relationship that benefits both parties. 

Lastly, the censorship of radical content, if sufficient liberties are maintained, could help counter the radicalisation of individuals, which is still a great concern after the Christchurch attacks. 

With these issues facing the SDD, it is imperative that NZ listens in closely to the discussions that shape ASEAN’s response to terrorism, as it affects the sovereignty, safety, and economy of NZ in one way or another.

Written by Liu Haoyue, Raynor Leo Kay Hon, Nay Myo Win